In 2001, as the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee prepared for its hearing to consider the nomination of John D. Negroponte to serve as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, it sought the declassification of certain materials from the CIA. However, based on discussion with CIA Director George Tenet, the senators agreed not to seek declassification but rather to have Tenet stipulate to certain facts. Thus, the Senate majority staff drafted a set of stipulations, which the CIA revised. Those stipulations, which follow, were presented to the Foreign Relations Committee for its Sept. 13, 2001 hearing on the Negroponte nomination.

STIPULATIONS FROM INTELLIGENCE REPORTING CABLE 

1. Information summarized in 1995 indicates that during the early 1980’s, the Public Security Forces in Honduras (FUSEP) had a special unit involved in countering domestic subversive movements. In addition, from 1980-1984, the National Directorate of Investigation (DNI), a unit of FUSEP, maintained a secret unit known as the Honduran Anti-Communist Liberation Army (ELACH). ELACH’s operations included surveillance kidnapings, interrogation under duress, and execution of prisoners who were Honduran Revolutionaries. ELACH reportedly maintained an informal liaison with members of the special unit of the Public Security Forces in Honduras.

 2. In April 1983, based on the recommendation of a joint U.S./Honduran Military Seminar, the Honduran Military resolved to convert the FUSEP Special Unit and place it under the supervision of the Military Intelligence Division of the Armed Forces General Staff. This occurred in early 1984 and the unit was renamed the Military Intelligence BN. 

3. From late 1980 to circa 1983, the United States Government maintained contact with the command structure with the objective of assisting in the creation of an effective mechanism to counter the growing threat from domestic subversive movement and from regional organizations operating in Honduras with links to the Sandinistas and Cuba. 

4. The Military BN was dissolved in September 1987. 

STIPULATIONS FROM CIA INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT 

1. Congressional and National Security Council (NSC) interest in the Baltimore Sun’s allegations prompted then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John M. Deutch to direct that a review be conducted of all CIA files to determine CIA’s role in Honduras and whether its personnel were linked to human rights abuses there from 1980 to 1995. The Honduras Working Group was established in July 1995 to conduct this review and published its final report in August 1996. Based upon the written record, selected interviews that were conducted by the Office of Personnel Security (OPS) on behalf of the Honduras Working Group, and responses to questionnaires that the Honduras Working Group prepared and distributed to 34 CIA officers in an attempt to resolve several issues, the review resulted in the following findings:  

• There is no information in CIA files indicating that CIA officers either authorized or were directly involved in human rights abuses;

• The Honduran military committed hundreds of human rights abuses since 1980, many of which were politically motivated and officially sanctioned;

• CIA reporting linked Honduran military personnel to ‘‘death squad’’ activities;  

2. In the early 1980’s, the U.S. Government provided assistance to several Honduran military units. 

3. Reporting indicated that a number of people from these Honduran units were involved in human rights abuses from 1980 to 1996. 

4. The CIA’s record in reporting human rights abuses was inconsistent. In some cases, reporting was timely and complete. In other cases [excised text] information was not reported at all [excised text] or was mentioned only in internal CIA channels and not disseminated to other agencies; CIA reporting to Congress in the early 1980’s underestimated Honduran [excised text] involvement in abuses. By the mid-1980’s, CIA provided more detailed information to Congress, but some of the notifications were inaccurate. 

5. Cooperation with Honduran military units provided access to significant information about the Honduran military and its activities. 

6. In July 1983, a small (96 member) group associated with the Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC) entered the Olancho Department of Honduras from Nicaragua. In August 1983, the Honduran military became aware of their presence. The guerrilla group was quickly overwhelmed by the Honduran military in August and September 1983, and its leader (Reyes Mata) was captured and killed. The Honduran military operation was followed closely by the U.S. Embassy and reported in the local media. 

7. The U.S. Government had advance intelligence information indicating a possible Central American Revolutionary Workers Party military operation. 

8. In late September 1983, the U.S. Embassy became aware that a U.S. priest, Father James Carney, who had been traveling with the guerrilla group, was missing, and began an investigation. Ambassador Negroponte and senior Embassy staff met with the Carney family on September 28. 

9. In September 1983, Ambassador Negroponte requested additional analytical assistance from the U.S. Government about the Olancho Guerrilla movement, including U.S. participation in the debriefing of deserters and captives. 

10. Subsequently, Ambassador Negroponte urged Embassy personnel to exploit the failure of the guerrillas from a broader regional standpoint. 

11. In October 1983, U.S. intelligence prepared reports regarding information it had received about the capture and summary execution of as many as nine Central American Revolutionary Workers Party guerrillas. Dissemination of these reports was limited because of Ambassador Negroponte’s concern about leaks. This information regarding the reports of guerrilla executions was reported to the President in October 1983. 

12. In early November 1983, after receiving the intelligence reports on the guerrilla executions, Deputy Assistant Secretary Craig Johnstone wrote Ambassador Negroponte and urged that he demarche General Alvarez regarding this matter. Negroponte met with Alvarez, who denied the reports. Negroponte reported back to Johnstone by letter. He noted the conflict between the intelligence reports and General Alvarez, raised questions about the reliability of the sources upon which the reports were based, and therefore urged that the United States not pursue the specific matter further with Alvarez. 

13. In an interview with CIA Inspector General, Ambassador Negroponte recalled as follows: 

Former U.S. Ambassador to Honduras Negroponte describes three significant concerns that were dominant throughout his assignment in Honduras. First, regional instability affecting Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. In this context, he says attempts were made to keep Honduras on an even keel by providing large amounts of economic and military assistance. A second concern related to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and was being addressed by U.S. assistance to the Contras. The third concern was that the United States was attempting to promote democracy in Honduras after the 1981 presidential election; the first in nine years. 

Negroponte indicates that there were instances of human rights abuses in Honduras and that he used diplomatic channels—calling on President Suazo, the Foreign Minister, or the Commander-in-Chief—to address them when they arose. Additionally, the Embassy used ‘‘quiet diplomacy’’ to suggest methods, such as the Administration of Justice Program, to prevent future abuses and ensure proper treatment of prisoners. Negroponte, although not justifying human rights abuses, says he believed Honduras had a much better human rights records than its neighboring countries. 

Negroponte states that Defense Attache Office and the Political Section had reporting responsibility for the Olancho Operation. Additionally, [excised text] was expected to provide information [excised text]. There were no contemporaneous complaints, says Negroponte, regarding the absence of reporting on the Olancho insurgency. The insurgency was viewed as a threat to the security of Honduras and as a precursor of additional attempts to invade the country. 

Negroponte says he became aware of the two CIA Sensitive Memoranda regarding prisoner executions via Johnstone’s November 2, 1983 correspondence. He indicates that Johnstone used a memorandum, not an electronic message, due to the sensitive nature of the information and was trying to prevent broad distribution in light of the volatile political environment concerning Central America. After confronting Commander-in-Chief Alvarez and hearing his denials, Negroponte says he harbored doubts over the accuracy of the reports of executions and recommended that the situation be closely monitored for future developments. If additional credible information were received, the matter would be revisited in order to take further action. 

Negroponte believes [excised text] personnel were concerned about human rights and notes that the Embassy was probably the busiest in the world and was focused on a variety of regional issues. At no time, says Negroponte, did he suggest [excised text] that it not report on a subject. 

At the time of the insurgency, Negroponte states that Father Carney’s citizenship was unclear, but the Embassy vigorously pursued details of his fate as if he were a U.S. citizen. After Carney’s family made inquiries at the Embassy, he says the Consul General was assigned the task of investigating the circumstance surrounding the priest’s disappearance. After the Consul General interviewed the captured insurgents, Negroponte recalls that the Embassy became convinced that Carney had died of natural causes due to the lack of nourishment. No information was obtained that indicated that the priest had been executed. 

Commander-in-Chief Alvarez was ousted from his position in March 1984. Thereafter, Negroponte recalls, disappearances stopped, human rights concerns diminished, and issues relating to possible abuses committed during the Olancho Operation no longer required monitoring. 

14. In November 1983, a reliable source reported that a member of the Honduran military had shot guerrilla leader Reyes Mata and that Commander-in-Chief Alvarez had probably been consulted. 

15. On November 17, 1983, a draft report was sent to Embassy. The report was circulated to the U.S. Government the next day. The report specifically named the Honduran officer who killed Reyes Mata. It also indicated that Commander-in-Chief Alvarez was consulted before and after the execution. CIA headquarters indicated that the basic information in the draft report—that prisoners had been executed—could not be refuted.  

16. CIA headquarters was made aware that Ambassador Negroponte was particularly sensitive on the subject set forth in the draft report and having been concerned that prior intelligence reporting on the same topic might create a human rights problem for Honduras. 

17. On November 25, 1983, Embassy Charge Shep Lowman wrote in an ‘‘eyes only’’ message to U.S. Assistant Chief of Staff General William Odom and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Craig Johnstone concerning the Defense Attache Office comments on the draft report. Lowman wrote that the Defense Attache Office comments tended to contradict information in the draft, and that: ‘‘The subject matter, however, is so sensitive that we would urge that any further dissemination on this subject should be sharply limited and, as had been the case with previous [excised text] reports, by memorandum restricted to designated addressees only.’’ 

18. Ambassador Negroponte believes that the dissemination of intelligence from Tegucigalpa Embassy was not affected by Honduran support to U.S. [excised text] programs. He says the Embassy did its best to collect relevant information and follow up on details concerning the fate of the Olancho insurgents and believes that there was no complacency by any Embassy component in reporting on the Olancho Operation. 

Negroponte says that he was out of the country from November 22 to 25, 1983 when discussions about the draft report were held within the Embassy. Negroponte believes that the sentiments attributed to him in the November 22, 1983 [excised text] report concerning the 1983 draft report are not accurate. Negroponte says that his position at the time was that it should be made certain that prisoner executions had occurred before taking further action such as publicizing the information or confronting President Suazo. He says he wanted to confirm details of the reported executions before the information was widely disseminated as it would become a significant political issue in Washington that could affect the [excised text] program. Negroponte says that his sentiments on the subject of executions are reflected in his November 18, 1983 response to Deputy Assistant Secretary Johnstone. 

CIA WORKING GROUP REPORT STIPULATIONS 

1. During the 1980-1984 period, the Honduran Military committed most of the hundreds of human rights abuses reported in Honduras. These abuses were often politically motivated and officially sanctioned. 

2. Some Honduran military units received United States Government assistance. Information available to the United States Government indicated that some members of these units, and others, were linked to ‘‘death squad’’ activities such as killings, disappearances, and other human rights abuses. 

3. As a result of United States policy countering Cuban/Nicaraguan communist-backed insurgencies in Central America, intelligence collection and reporting requirements on human rights abuses were subordinated to higher priorities. 

4. Between 1984-1987 the FUSEP Special Unit was converted to the Battalion 316. These units were involved in similar counter-subversive activities. 

5. As a result of a file review and other information available to the United States Government, some 250 alleged abuses of human rights were identified. 

6. FUSEP Special Unit and Battalion 316 counter-terrorist tactics included torture, rape, assassination against persons thought to be involved in support of Salvadoran guerrillas or past of the Honduran leftist movement. Information available to the United States Government in the 1980’s indicated that named individuals were abducted and killed by Battalion 316 and the FUSEP Special Unit. 

7. ‘‘Death Squads’’ used tactics such as killings, kidnapping, torture, and clandestine abduction. 

8. The United States was aware of one death squad in Honduras that operated between 1980 and 1984. It was known as the Honduran Anti-Communist Liberation Army (ELACH). Reports indicate that ELACH was responsible for the killings of a number of leftists during that period. This information was disseminated and was the focus of Congressional concern. Although promises were made to investigate and/or expand upon these initial reports, there is no written evidence that these promises were met. 

9. Unsubstantiated information links Honduran Military Command and high-ranking government officials, with the ELACH. 

10. The United States Government does not have sufficient information to definitively rule out the possibility that the Honduran military may have captured, interrogated, and killed Father James Carney. 

11. It has been reported that some Honduran military records of human rights violations were destroyed in 1995 at the direction of the Honduran military command. 

12. Information is available to the United States Government which linked the Chief of Honduran Department of National Investigations from June 1982 to January 1984 to the Honduran Anti-Communist Liberation Army ‘‘Death Squad’’ activities. The Government of Honduras dismissed this officer in 1984 after the death of a prisoner while in the custody of the Honduran Department of National Investigations.